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I wandered around-up the hill and over the meadows, along the
stream, through the orchard. . ., across the semineglected lawns-
in a haze of silly questions. Did I own the water in the brook? Did I
own the soil and rocks down to the earth's core? I figured that I
didn't own the scarlet tanager that I saw flying like a winged flame
in the orchard, but had I owned it when it was a nestling, if it came
from that orchard in the first place?'
These questions, asked by a contemporary writer after receiving
a reversionary interest in a New England farm, suggest the elusive
nature of property: Does it extend vertically above and below the
surface of the land, or does it merely consist of its horizontal surface?
Legal theorists have long asked these and other "silly questions" as
they wandered through the haze of property law. This Note does not
claim to provide satisfactory answers to these questions, nor does it
claim to remove the haze. Instead, it focuses on a single question: Is
airspace property within the specific context of takings jurisprudence?
In order to reach this narrow question, however, it is necessary, to
pose the broader ones. But it must be understood that their answers,
like property itself, remain elusive.
A. General Principles of Takings Jurisprudence
The fifth amendment prohibits the taking of private property
without just compensation.2 The prohibition is traditionally applied
when the government exercises its power of eminent domain in the
context of a condemnation proceeding.3 Generally, in such a case, the
private owner does not question the government's power to take his
property. Rather, he invokes the takings clause to insure that he is
paid and that the payment offered him is "just."4
I Notes and Comment, The New Yorker, Sept. 16, 1985, at 27-28.
2 U.S. Const. amend. V (". . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation") [hereinafter referred to as the "takings clause"]. This provision is applica-
ble against the states through the 14th amendment. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226 (1897).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 255 (1980).
4 In United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970), Justice Stewart explained the
notion of just compensation as follows:
And "just compensation" means the full monetary equivalent of the property
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A property owner may also invoke the takings clause in a suit
against the government in which he challenges the validity of a partic-
ular government action as applied to his property.5 In this context-
often called an inverse condemnation proceeding-the property
owner asks the court to decide whether a taking has occurred.6 If the
court determines that it has, it will permit the action to continue only
upon the government's payment of compensation to the property
owner; or, as is often the case, the court may invalidate the action
altogether.
taken. The owner is to be put in the same position monetarily as he would have
occupied if his property had not been taken. In enforcing the constitutional man-
date, the Court at an early date adopted the concept of market value: the owner is
entitled to the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking.
5 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (state
statute mandating easements be sold to cable television companies); San Diego Gas & Elec.
Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (open-space zoning); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255 (1980) (low density zoning restrictions); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164 (1979) (designation of private inlet as navigable waterway); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (designation of railroad terminal as city landmark);
Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (low level plane flights into county-owned
airport); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (low level flights by government-owned
planes); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (comprehensive zoning).
A property owner may also challenge the validity of the government's action as a defense
to a government suit to enforce its action. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590 (1962) (property owner challenging constitutionality of ordinance as defense to town's suit
to enforce it); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (state law prohibiting
mining of coal beneath residential dwelling).
It is argued that the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments provide a
more sound approach to such cases. See, e.g., Comment, Testing the Constitutional Validity
of Land Use Regulations: Substantive Due Process as a Superior Alternative to Takings Anal-
ysis, 57 Wash. L. Rev. 715 (1982); infra text accompanying notes 20-21.
6 The distinction between inverse condemnation and condemnation suits was described by
the Ninth Circuit in American Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. County of Marin, 653 F.2d 364, 369 (9th
Cir. 1981): "The issue is not the same in condemnation cases and in inverse condemnation
cases. In condemnation cases the issue is damages: How much is due the landowner as just
compensation? In inverse condemnation the issue is liability: Has the government's action
effected a taking of the landowner's property?"
7 At present, there are at least two different, but related controversies surrounding the
remedies of invalidation and compensation. The first asserts that when a regulation goes "too
far" it is an abuse of the police power granted under the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments and thus, even then, should not be characterized as a "taking." See,
e.g., Comment, supra note 5. In such a case, proponents of this argument assert that invalida-
tion is the only appropriate remedy. Therefore, it is argued, compensation is appropriate only
when the power of eminent domain is invoked under the takings clause. See, e.g., Comment,
Balancing Private Loss Against Public Gain to Test for a Violation of Due Process or a Taking
Without Just Compensation, 54 Wash. L. Rev. 315, 315 (1979).
As a practical matter, however, the takings and due process clauses and their respective
remedies of compensation and invalidation are often used interchangeably to describe the con-
stitutional limits of a government's power to restrict private property. Recently, Justice Ste-
vens, concurring in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S.
Ct. 3108, 3125 (1985), noted that in most cases that challenge government regulations, courts
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There is little dispute that governments may exercise their police
power to restrict citizens' use of property in order to protect the
health, safety, and morals of the community.8 Indeed, a legislature's
power to restrict private property has been described as "one of the
most essential powers of government,-one that is the least limita-
ble." 9 It is through the exercise of the police power that a number of
government functions are made possible. They include zoning," his-
torical preservation," and environmental protection."2 Although
rule that the regulation is invalid or characterize it as a taking, but the essence of either hold-
ing is the same: the harm caused may not be imposed unless the government is prepared to pay
for it. See Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385
N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976); Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 1057, 1091-93 (1980) (referring to "police power takings"); Comment, supra note 5, at
716 & n.6. Indeed, despite courts' reference to "takings," invalidation rather than compensa-
tion is more likely to be the remedy granted. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge 277 U.S.
183 (1928).
This merger of unconstitutional takings and deprivations of due process is often offered as
an explanation for much of the confusion in an area of law which has come to be known as
"'taking' jurisprudence." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130
(1978); Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court
Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 63, 75 (1962). It is to dispel some of this confusion
that proponents of the due process analysis urge the dissociation of the two clauses and their
remedies.
Whatever the merits of this argument, it is beyond the scope of this Note which will adopt
(some may say "perpetuate") the "takings" nomenclature so often used by the courts.
A second area of controversy surrounding invalidation and compensation has arisen over
the issue of whether or not governments are required to compensate a landowner who has
successfully persuaded a court to invalidate a government regulation. Termed "temporary
takings," the issue has yet to be decided by the Supreme Court. Williamson County, 105 S. Ct.
3108; San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). This issue is also beyond the scope of this Note; however, for an
interesting and thought-provoking discussion of it, see Sterk, Government Liability for Uncon-
stitutional Land Use Regulation, 60 Ind. L.J. 113 (1984).
8 In general terms, the" 'police' or 'regulatory power of government' is its power to direct
the activities of persons within its jurisdiction." Stoebuck, supra note 7, at 1057. Unfortu-
nately, the courts have not come up with a more precise description of "police power."
An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case
must turn on its own facts. The definition is essentially the product of legislative
determinations addressed to the purposes of government, purposes neither ab-
stractly nor historically capable of complete definition. ...
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these
are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the
police power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the
power and do not delimit it.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
For a classic and comprehensive work, see E. Freund, The Police Power (1904).
9 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (upholding city's closing of brick
factory without compensation despite property's 85% loss in value).
10 E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (validating compre-
hensive zoning as a means of land use regulation despite 75% reduction in value of plaintiffs
land).
I1 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (landmarks
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:489
such actions are admittedly destructive of private property, they may
be conducted without invoking the takings clause. 3 In Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 14 Justice Holmes acknowledged that governments,
in exercising their police power, "hardly could go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying
for every such change in the general law."'" But, Justice Holmes also
wrote that "[t]he general rule at least is, that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recog-
nized as a taking."16
But Holmes' "general rule" does not appear to have been fol-
lowed by nineteenth-century courts. During that time the eminent
domain power, the police power, and the power to tax were all viewed
as fundamental attributes of sovereignty.' 7 To the extent that the ex-
pression of that sovereignty through the taxing or police power de-
stroyed or impinged upon private property rights, the takings clause"
was routinely invoked to compel the payment of compensation. 19
Such challenges were rarely successful, however. Courts reasoned
that property was only taken within the meaning of the takings clause
when it was physically appropriated,2" implying that the exercise of
one sovereign power could not be limited by operation of another.2"
This traditional analysis of takings cases incorporated a particu-
preservation). But see Lutheran Church in Am. v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316
N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974) (invalidating application of landmarks preservation law as
applied to plaintiffs building).
12 See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (protection of endangered birds); Just v.
Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (wetlands conservation).
13 "[A]ll agree that compensation is required only for a governmental 'taking' of property
and not for losses occasioned by mere 'regulation,' .... " Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 Yale L.J. 36, 37 (1964); see also Stoebuck, supra note 7, at 1060 & n.20 (noting that cases
cited are "explainable only by the general rule that regulations are not takings").
14 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
15 Id. at 413.
16 Id. at 415.
17 E.g., Beekman v. Saratoga & S.R.R., 3 Paige Ch. 46 (N.Y. Ch. 1831) (eminent domain
power); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (police power); Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend.
65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840) (taxing power).
18 Most states' constitutions contain clauses similar to the federal takings clause. E.g., Pa.
Const. art. I, § 10. Many of the challenges to the states' sovereign power were brought under
these provisions. E.g., Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853).
19 See, e.g., Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840); Sharpless v. Mayor of
Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853).
20 See Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 166 (1853).
21 The Supreme Court's opinion in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), typifies this
approach to the takings question. Rejecting a claim that a Kansas statute prohibiting the
operation of breweries effected a taking of the plaintiffs brewery, Justice Harlan explained that
the 14th amendment could not be read to invalidate otherwise valid exercises of the police
power simply because restrictions were placed on an owner's use of his land. Id. at 668-69; see
Sax, supra note 13, at 38-39; Stoebuck, supra note 7, at 1060 & nn.17-18.
1986] TAKINGS JURISPR UDENCE
lar view of property rights.22 Through the middle of the nineteenth
century, property ownership was conceived of as an individual's ex-
clusive right of absolute dominion over a physical object.23 This
traditional formulation contained two distinctive elements: (1) an in-
dividual's absolute right; and (2) a tangible thing to which the right
attached. 24  Given this conception of property, the takings clause
could only apply to cases in which physical property was seized or
appropriated; mere diminution in value of property as the result of
government action was of no legal significance.25
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, American courts
began to recognize new types of property, such as trademarks and
trade secrets, which did not fall within the old, doctrinal formula-
tion.26 As they did so, courts and legal theorists began to reformulate
22 To discuss the Court's development in the area of takings law, one must also discuss the
Court's notion of property:
The constitutional concepts of "taking" and "property" are intertwined. To
discuss one sometimes requires the making of assumptions about the nature of the
other. In fact one of the persistent problems that complicates most analysis of
certain difficult eminent domain cases is the failure of judges and legal writers to
separate the two concepts.
Stoebuck, supra note 7, at 1083.
This requirement comes not only from the constitutional underpinnings of takings law,
see supra note 2, but also from the nature of the words themselves, HonorE, Ownership, in
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 112-28 (A. Guest ed. 1961). As Professor Ackerman states:
"At best these words set out a number of basic questions that must be answered:
when does an interest qualify as private property? under what conditions should
the state be said to have 'taken' the interest? when does justice demand compensa-
tion and how is the adequacy of payment to be assessed? . . . [T]here are many
different ways of answering these questions .... "
B. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 6 (1977).
There is another question raised by the takings clause: What is public use? Cases arising
in this area of the law stem from the constitutional proscription against taking for "public
use." U.S. Const. amend. V.; see, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410
Mich. 616, 629, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (1981) (city's condemnation of private property for
conveyance to third party for use as factory valid as public use "to promote industry and
commerce, thereby adding jobs and taxes to [city's] economic base"); Courtesy Sandwich
Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963)
(development of World Trade Center sufficiently "public" to justify use of eminent domain).
23 Blackstone described the right of property as "that sole and despotic dominion which
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the
right of any other individual in the universe." 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *2; see Vande-
velde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Con-
cept of Property, 29 Buffalo L. Rev. 325, 330-33 (1980).
24 So strong was the requirement for a thing, that if none existed, one was reified as in the
case of an incorporeal hereditament. Profits, leases, and easements all fell under the rubric of
incorporeal hereditaments. Admittedly intangible, incorporeal hereditaments were, neverthe-
less, capable of being the object of absolute dominion. 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *20.
25 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); see also Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (I
Pick.) 418 (1823).
26 E.g., Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (describing rights associated with trade-
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their definition of property to describe relationships between people
instead of relationships between people and things.27 This new con-
ception of property differed from the traditional conception in two
ways. First, property ownership was no longer either absolute or ex-
clusive. Instead of absolute dominion, the individual held a bundle of
rights which could be grouped in various ways. 28  These rights in-
cluded exclusivity, income, use, possession, management, economic
benefits, consumption, alienation, and immunity from expropria-
tion.29 Second, because property was described in terms of the rela-
tionships between people, intangible things could be analyzed within
the new system of rights.3"
To the extent that intangible property became recognized and
protected by the courts, the purely appropriative model of takings
analysis no longer sufficed. 3 As property relations came to be viewed
as a bundle of rights that could be packed and unpacked in various
ways, legal recognition of a property interest meant that the govern-
ment could destroy certain sticks in the bundle without appropriating
mark as property rights); see Vandevelde, supra note 23, at 340-54. There are a number of
explanations for this development in the law of property. One emphasizes the fact that the
traditional notion of property "arose in a society in which a low level of economic activity
made conflicts over land use extremely rare." M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American
Law, 1780-1860, at 31 (1977). As economic activity increased so did conflicts over competing
uses of land, and their resolution required an alteration of the traditional notion of an absolute
right to property. Production and development, in turn, created new forms of value whose
protection also depended upon the elimination of the traditional notion of property. Id.
Another explanation emphasizes legal developments rather than economic ones. It cred-
its the expansion of equity jurisprudence and the adoption of the 14th amendment with en-
couraging parties to define their interests as "property" in order to maximize the extent to
which they could receive legal protection. Vandevelde, supra note 23, at 333-34.
27 For the famous reformulation of the theory of property as relationships between people,
see Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale
L.J. 16, 30 (1913). These relationships, described as "'the lowest common denominators of
the law' " were identified as "rights and duties, privileges and no-rights, powers and liabilities,
immunities and disabilities." Id. at 58.
28 Of course, "'ownership' does not always imply the same set of sticks in the bundle of
rights." Oakes, "Property Rights," in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 Wash. L. Rev. 583,
589 n.25 (1981); see infra note 32. The ultimate grouping has been described as "the end result
of process of competition among inconsistent and contending economic values." Sax, supra
note 13, at 61.
This general view of property is broadly accepted in modern legal scholarship. See, e.g.,
R. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 188-90 (1985); Un-
ger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 561 (1983).
29 See Honor6, supra note 22, at 112-28. Honor6 described these rights as "the standard
incidents of ownership" which may be regarded as "necessary ingredients in the notion of
ownership." Id. at 112; accord, Oakes, supra note 28, at 589. Professor Richard Epstein
would "boil down" these incidents to a triumvirate: possession, use, and disposition. R. Ep-
stein, supra note 28, at 59.
30 See Vandevelde, supra note 23, at 335-38.
31 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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the property.3
2
A classic example can be found in the Mahon case; there, a coal
company that had sold the surface of a parcel of land while retaining
as its only interest the right to mine the coal beneath the surface asked
the court to decide whether the mining interest was protectable under
the fifth amendment's takings clause.3 3 Over a dissent by Justice
Brandeis, the Court answered the question affirmatively and, in an
opinion by Justice Holmes, enunciated a "too far" analysis for takings
in place of the appropriative model.34
Instead of stressing the different origins of governmental power,
the Court described the police power and the power of eminent do-
main as occupying different points along a single continuum. 35 Under
this analysis, government action along the continuum-from a valid
police power action to an exercise of eminent domain-can be mea-
sured according to the diminution in value of an individual's property
interest.36 "Too far" simply represents the point at which diminution
in value is extensive enough to support a finding of appropriation.
3 7
32 Protection from government appropriation was, after all, only one of the sticks in the
bundle of rights.
[P]roperty law is, or should be, an examination and resolution of the conflicts be-
tween or among the different holders of the sets of rights. Constitutional analysis
of property rights in [this] sense involved an examination of when the Constitu-
tion, through the fifth and fourteenth amendments, either precludes a reassign-
ment of one or more of those rights from one person's bundle to another's . . . or
requires in connection with reassignment of one or more of those rights to the state
the payment of "just compensation."
Oakes, supra note 28, at 589.
33 260 U.S. at 413.
34 Id. at 415. Professor Stoebuck argues that with Mahon's "too far" test, the Court
"placed in its constitutional grab-bag a doctrine contrary to Mugler's .... Without choosing
between the two decisions, it must be said the decision in Mahon begins the era of extreme
confusion about police power takings that still exists." Stoebuck, supra note 7, at 1063.
35 Justice Holmes' statement, quoted supra text accompanying note 16, implies the use of
the continuum theory. He also wrote:
[S]ome values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits. . . . One fact
for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When
it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise
of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.
260 U.S. at 413; see Sax, supra note 13, at 40-42.
36 260 U.S. at 413.
37 At one end of the continuum, lies the individual, entitled to compensation; at the other
lies the state, able to avoid payment of compensation by regrouping the bundle of rights in
ways to fit within the reaches of the police power. One commentator pointed out that
although both extremes are objectionable, the former is at least more objective. Dunham,
supra note 7, at 80-81.
In describing these extremes, another author described the court's role as similar to:
the bedeviled horseman . . . shakily astride the police and eminent domain powers
as it seeks to give direction in land use affairs. . . . The steeds it rides are ill-
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Adoption of the "too far" test represented an important contri-
bution to property law because it permitted many new forms of intan-
gible property to be protected under the takings clause. Using this
analysis, the Supreme Court has extended protection from takings to
such property interests as liens,3" contracts,39 trade secrets, 4 lease re-
newals,41 and purchase options, 42 which, because they did not fall
within the traditional conception of property, could not easily be
"taken" in the early nineteenth-century sense of physical
appropriation.
Nevertheless, adoption of the "too far" test has resulted in con-
siderable uncertainty as to the logic underlying its use; deciding how
much diminution in property value is "too far" remains a matter of
intuition rather than a precise calculus. 4 Further imprecision and
unpredictability may arise because the "too far" analysis can turn on
considerations other than loss in value per se. For example, a court
may feel that some types of property are "worthier" of protection
than others,4 4 or that a particular government activity merits the
near-total destruction of a property's value in order to be effective. 45
Similarly, if a government action adversely affects only part of an in-
dividual's property, the calculation of how much the property has di-
minished in value will depend on whether the court measures the
matched, sharing little sympathy for one another or for their wobbly master. The
stakes in mastering them are momentous, reaching ultimately to the very defini-
tion of the property concept itself.
Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accomodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Im-
passe in Land Use Controversies, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1021, 1021-22 (1975).
38 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 46 (1960).
39 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
40 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862, 2873-74 (1984).
41 Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473 (1973).
42 United States v. 3,035.73 Acres of Land, 650 F.2d 938, 940 (8th Cir. 1981).
43 The Supreme Court itself has admitted the problems with a "too far" test. Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). The Penn Central Court's admission of its difficulties in developing a
predictable approach to the taking question was described as a moment of "disarming can-
dor." Marcus, The Grand Slam Grand Central Terminal Decision: A Euclid for Landmarks,
Favorable Notice for TDR and A Resolution of the Regulatory/Taking Impasse, 7 Ecology
L.Q. 731, 741 (1978); see also, Stoebuck, supra note 7, at 1059 (calling J. Brennan's remark in
Penn Central "quite a concession").
More recently, Circuit Judge Oakes, in examining the Court's opinion in Penn Central,
said the Court's catalogue of theories used in takings jurisprudence demonstrated "that the
'jurisprudence' is static, confused and conflicting, as it has been at least since Pennsylvania
Coal." Oakes, supra note 28, at 611. He went on to remark that "[tihe takings 'jurisprudence'
of the Supreme Court is still in an unsatisfactory ad hoc stage, with a lack of development of
analytical principle or reconciliation of conflicting lines of precedent." Id. at 613.
,4 See supra note 37.
45 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928).
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diminution in terms of the part or the whole of the affected property;
under a "too far" analysis, the choice between the part or the whole
may often prove determinative.4 6
Some scholars have lamented the imprecision of the Court's deci-
sions, describing them as forming a "crazy quilt pattern" of takings
jurisprudence.47  Others have tried to meet the challenge by sug-
gesting if not a precise formula, then at least a general framework for
analysis. For example, one author has suggested a test which would
find a taking only when a regulation is specifically directed toward
benefiting a governmental entity.4" But the Court has failed to adopt
any one of these methods to the exclusion of the others.49
B. Perspective and Approach
This Note suggests a broad point about the appropriate spirit in
which courts should implement the "too far" analysis of takings law
and advocates the treatment of airspace as protectable property under
the fifth amendment. It asserts that thus far the Supreme Court has
failed to recognize as takings acts that radically diminish the value of
airspace. While such a position might be understandable in light of
common law and doctrinal history, it is no longer tenable in light of
modern legal theory and common real estate practices.
Part II examines the historical and modern treatment of airspace
within the framework around which the Court has built its taking
jurisprudence. Part III considers the effect that extrajudicial factors
have had on the treatment of airspace and the shaping of individual
expectations with respect to it. Part IV sheds new light on the most
46 The effect of this choice between the part or the whole is made clear in a comparison of
the majority and dissenting opinions in American Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. County of Marin, 653
F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1981). See also Mahon, 260 U.S. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); R. Ep-
stein, supra note 28, at 57-58.
47 Dunham, supra note 7, at 63. For another colorful simile, see Stoebuck, supra note 7, at
1059 n. 11, noting that "the collected decisions of the Supreme Court, and all other courts,
leave the subject as disheveled as a ragpicker's coat."
Despite the colorful language, the Court's imprecision presents serious problems that ulti-
mately reach "to the very definition of the property concept itself." Costonis, supra note 37, at
1022.
48 Stoebuck, supra note 7, at 1093. But see Causby v. United States, 328 U.S. 256 (1946),
in which Justice Douglas wrote: "It is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain which is the mea-
sure of the value of the property taken." Id. at 261. A more radical approach to the takings
question was suggested by Professor Costonis, who urged adoption of a middle position on the
continuum occupied by the police power and the power of eminent domain. Termed the "ac-
commodation power," his proposal would offer "fair" rather than "just" compensation where
resort to either of the traditional alternatives, see supra text accompanying note 34, would
produce unsatisfactory results. Costonis, supra note 37, at 1022.
49 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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recent Supreme Court case to have considered an airspace takings
claim in an urban context and suggests a method of analysis which, it
is argued, would preserve the emerging notion that airspace in many
circumstances is deserving of fifth amendment protection from un-
compensated takings. Part V expands on that method of analysis and
shows how a court might implement it. This Note concludes that
courts should consider the circumstances giving rise to individual ex-
pectations concerning airspace and extend constitutional protection to
them.
II. AIRSPACE AND ITS TAKING
A. Background
Most discussions of airspace 5° begin with a discussion of the
Latin maxim, cujus est ejus solum est usque ad coelum et ad inferos-
whomsoever owns the surface also owns from the heavens to the
depths." The maxim suggests that real property occupies a vertical
column of space with the surface of the earth lying along a horizontal
plane at the column's center; all rights which attach to the surface
similarly attach to the portions of the column above and beneath it as
well.52 The maxim, reifying property, thus fit neatly within the tradi-
tional assumptions abdut property to the extent that it permitted ab-
solute dominion to be conferred on the airspace.5 3
50 See Frankel, Three-Dimensionsal Real Property Law: The Truth About "Air Rights,"
12 Real Estate L.J. 330, 338-41 (1984).
51 In a footnote, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946), attributed the maxim to Coke, Blackstone, and Kent. 328 U.S. at 261 n.5.
Although Professor Blackstone wrote about the maxim in his commentaries, he acknowledged
its origin to be in the civil law. 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *8. Authorities differ as to its
precise origin. One of the more interesting explanations attributes the maxim to an ancient
Anglo-Saxon belief that justified the removal of projections over burial grounds: "[T]o the
sepulchre belongs not alone the ground enclosing the remains, but everything even up to the
Heavens." Hise, Ownership and Sovereignty of the Air or Air Space Above Landowner's
Premises with Special Reference to Aviation, 16 Iowa L. Rev. 169, 173 (1931). Other refer-
ences note the maxim's incorporation into the Napoleonic Code. Eubank, The Doctrine of the
Airspace Zone of Effective Possession, 12 B.U.L. Rev. 414, 416 (1932).
52 William Blackstone wrote this about the maxim:
Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite extent, upwards as well
as downwards. Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum, is the maxim of the law,
upwards. . . . [T]he word "land" includes not only the face of the earth, but
every thing under it, or over it.
2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *18. The breadth of Blackstone's statement is illustrated by
the quotation that begins this Note. See supra text accompanying note 1.
53 In Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, 25 A. 597 (1893) the status of the
column beneath the surface was in issue. Writing for the court, Chief Judge Paxson stated:
Formerly a man who owned the surface owned it to the centre of the earth. Now
the surface of the land may be separated from the different strata underneath it,
and there may be as many different owners as there are strata. . . . So it often
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But even within the traditional theory of property, a counter-
vailing maxim, res omnium communes, was often invoked to suggest
that ownership was qualified with respect to airspace.54 As one au-
thority wrote, the "position of this space or column of air is pecu-
liar."55 The res omnium communes maxim described air as "not,
properly speaking, [a] 'thing[] in the legal sense of the term, inasmuch
as [it is] . . . not, as such, susceptible of human dominion."56 The
open air is thus prevented, wrote Sohm, "from being the object of
private rights."57 Although different from the wild animal or res nul-
lius, which originally belongs to no one but can become the object of
private ownership through possession with the intent to control, 58 air-
space analyzed under the res ominum maxim is not inconsistent with
the traditional definition of property, insofar as it contemplates the
idea that only physical property can be subject to property rights.5 9
Blackstone, perhaps the primary expositor of the traditional view
of property, seemed to waiver between these two positions. On the
one hand he likened the open air to
[an] animal[]. . . of a wild and untameable disposition: which any
man may seise upon and keep for his own use or pleasure ...
[S]o long as [it] remain[s] in possession, every man has a right to
enjoy [it] without disturbance; but if once [it] escape[s] from his
custody, or he voluntarily abandons the use of [it], [it] return[s] to
the common stock, and any man else has an equal right to seise
and enjoy [it] afterwards.'
On the other hand, he likened air to flowing water,6" and described
both as examples of things which "must still unavoidably remain in
happens that the owner of a farm sells the land to one man, the iron, or oil, or gas
to another, giving to each purchaser a deed, or conveyance in fee simple for his
particular deposit or stratum, while he retains the surface for settlement and culti-
vation precisely as he held it before. The severance is complete for all legal and
practical purposes. Each of the separate layers or strata becomes a subject of taxa-
tion, of incumbrance, levy, and sale, precisely like the surface.
Id. at 295-96, 25 A. at 598.
54 R. Sohm, The Institutes of Roman Law 226 (J. Ledlie trans. 1892).
55 E.S.M., Horizontal Divisions of Land, 10 Am. L. Reg. 577, 579 (n.s.l.) (1862) (emphasis
added).
56 R. Sohm, supra note 54, at 226. This observation about airspace is in keeping with the
traditional formulation of property, supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text; see Hinman v.
Pacific Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 654 (1937).
57 R. Sohm, supra note 54, at 225; see infra note 63.
58 R. Sohm, supra note 54, at 227, 237.
59 See infra note 63.
60 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *14; see infra note 63.
61 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *14. With this characterization, the Romans appar-
ently agreed. See Sohm, supra note 54, at 226.
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common."
62
Some commentators have attempted to reconcile these different
descriptions of rights in airspace,63 recognizing how both maxims can
be viewed as consistent with the traditional view of property. The
cujus maxim, as modified by the res omnium maxim, could be under-
stood to mean that "the vested right of the owner to construct and
plant extended to an indefinite height, if such a contingency should
become at any time a possibility."' Yet until such time as the land-
owner exercises his contingent rights, airspace could be treated as
public or common property.65
Early English courts seemed to adopt this view, recognizing that
landowners held some interest in the space above their land but not an
unlimited or absolute interest. The limitations on ownership of air-
space become evident in considering the proper forms of pleading for
62 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *14.
63 One explanation for the competing philosophies characterizes the doctrines as referring
to different things: cujus referring to "space" and res communes to air as an element. This
distinction is important to the proper understanding of airspace in property law. As Professor
Richard Wright explains:
This understanding that the basic thing we are dealing with is not "air" but
"space," is essential, since it carries us past the ridiculous sophistry of those writ-
ers who insist that "air" cannot be owned since it is a gaseous substance continu-
ally in motion. The statement that air cannot be owned because of its properties is
wholly irrelevant, and if it were ever expressed as a serious legal impediment, it
could only have been for the purpose of providing a convenient red herring to
confuse the pursuers of the space ownership concept. While air is a gaseous, mo-
bile substance, unoccupied space like empty land stands always in the same place
since its position is related to the land surface. It is always capable of occupancy,
and it is in the constructive possession of the surface owner. Once it is sold, its
position is still positively identifiable in relationship to the land surface if it is cor-
rectly described. If it is incorrectly or not sufficiently described, it is no different
from a strip of undeveloped land whose metes and bounds description proves inad-
equate. Once conveyed to a third party, it passes constructively into his posses-
sion, and it may be subject to trespass, adverse possession, prescriptive use and all
the other things which might conceivably happen to open land. Theoretically,
once the preoccupation of talking about "air" is abandoned, there is no need to
view ownership of subjacent space as being essentially different from the ownership
of an open field.
R. Wright, The Law of Airspace 221-22 (1968). Professor Wright concludes: "[A]irspace is
subject to private ownership separate and apart from the land surface." Id. at 259.
64 Bouv6, Private Ownership of Airspace, I Air L. Rev. 232, 246 (1930). This seems to be
the position taken by the American courts in takings cases as they examined only the extent to
which the property owner's use of the surface has been diminished. Compare United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (interference with surface gave rise to decision that invasions of
airspace was a taking), with Hero Lands Co. v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1262 (Cl. Ct.) (no
taking found where invasion of airspace did not interfere with use of land), aft'd, 727 F.2d 1118
(Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2346 (1984).
65 See supra text accompanying notes 54-59.
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a landowner claiming interference with his airspace.66 For example,
in Pickering v. Rudd,6 7 the plaintiff sued in trespass when a board of
his neighbor's was affixed to his house in such a way as to extend over
the plaintiff's land.68 The court refused to allow the action in trespass,
thereby rejecting the cujus maxim in its pure form.69 In finding for
the defendant, the court held that the suit could be maintained only as
an action on the case, suggesting that whatever harm the plaintiff suf-
fered could only be measured by examining his land, not the air above
it. 70
American courts did not always follow the English rule.71  In
Butler v. Frontier Telephone Co. ,72 for example, the New York Court
of Appeals was asked whether or not an ejectment action could be
maintained to remove telephone wires strung above, though not
touching, the plaintiff's land.7 3 The court reasoned that because eject-
ment was the proper action for recovering possession of real property,
and because airspace was real property, its wrongful occupation
would give rise to the action.74 The court expressly adopted the cujus
maxim and found for the plaintiff without requiring a demonstration
of any harm to the land beneath the wires in order to maintain the
suit.7 5 Similar results are found in other jurisdictions.76
66 The precision of the pleadings was very important because a property owner's success in
court often depended "upon the accuracy of his claim." F. Maitland, The Forms of Action at
Common Law 67 (1941).
67 171 Eng. Rep. 70 (1815).
68 Trespass was originally a semi-criminal action at common law which involved unlawful
force "against the body, the goods, the land of the plaintiff." F. Maitland, supra note 66, at 48,
53. The plaintiff claiming trespass was not required to prove that he had suffered any physical
damage, only that the defendant had used force against him. However, by the end of the 14th
century, another form of action, action on the case, emerged. Id. at 66. To succeed, proof of
force was unnecessary. Liability would be imposed if the plaintiff could prove he had suffered
an injury. Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts 30, 67 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
69 171 Eng. Rep. at 70. Lord Ellenborough wrote: "Nay, if this board overhanging the
plaintiff's garden be a trespass, it would follow that an aeronaut is liable to an action of tres-
pass. . . at the suit of the occupier of every field over which his balloon passes in the course of
his voyage." Id. at 71.
70 Indeed, Lord Ellenborough wrote: "If any damage arises from the object which over-
hangs the close, the remedy is by action on the case." Id.
71 Professor Lawrence Friedman points out that several American courts and legislatures
"brushed aside" many of the English rules of property law in an effort to cope with the realities
of a vast, land-rich country. L. Friedman, A History of American Law 206 (1973).
72 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (1906).
73 Id. at 488, 79 N.E. at 716.
74 Adoption of the cujus maxim permitted the court to treat the airspace as a "thing"-
capable of absolute dominion. See supra note 52-53 and accompanying text.
75 186 N.Y. at 491-92, 79 N.E. at 718.
If the wire had touched the surface of the land in permanent and exclusive occupa-
tion, it is conceded that the plaintiff would have been dispossessed pro tanto. A
part of his premises would not have been in his possession, but in the possession of
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B. Airspace in the Age of Air Travel: Contingent Rights Versus
Commercial Necessity
The characterization and apportionment of rights in airspace be-
came more complicated with the advent of commercial air travel."
In an effort to encourage the nascent commercial air industry, Con-
gress passed the Air Commerce Act of 1926.78 The Act proclaimed
that the United States had complete and exclusive national sover-
eignty in the airspace over its territory79 to the extent of what Con-
gress called the "navigable airspace,""0 including the area necessary
for safe take-offs and landings. 8 I By exercising sovereignty over the
air, Congress imposed a legislative apportionment of rights to airspace
reminiscent of the common law maxim res omnium communes.8 2
Supporters of the Act regarded the continued acceptance of the
cujus maxim in some jurisdictions to be "one of the most substantial
grounds for the apprehension or embarrassment in the adequate en-
couragement of commercial air flight."'8 3 They favored abandoning
the doctrine entirely by limiting property owners' interest in airspace
to that which was incident to their use of the land.84  The courts
agreed and denied relief to property owners unless they could also
another. The extent of the disseisin, however, does not control, for an owner is
entitled to the absolute and undisturbed possession of every part of his premises,
including the space above, as much as a mine beneath. If the wire had been a huge
cable, several inches thick and but a foot above the ground, there would have been
a difference in degree, but not in principle. Expand the wires into a beam. . . and
the difference would still be one of degree only. Enlarge the beam into a bridge,
and yet space only would be occupied. Erect a house upon the bridge, and the air
above the surface of the land would alone be disturbed.
Id., 79 N.E. at 718.
76 E.g., McDivitt v. Bronson, 101 Neb. 437, 163 N.W. 761 (1917) (ejectment was the
proper action where defendant's bay window projected over the plaintiff's boundary). These
results, and specifically the Butler case were not without their detractors. E.g., Comment,
Ejectment-Removal of Telephone Wires, 16 Yale L.J. 275 (1907).
77 Was the statement of Lord Ellenborough made in 1815 in Pickering v. Rudd, quoted
supra note 69, prophetic?
78 Air Commerce Act, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568 (1926) (repealed 1958).
79 Id. § 6(a), at 572.
80 Id. § 10, at 574.
81 Although the Air Commerce Act was repealed in 1958, the present code contains many
features contained in the original act. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. 1301 (29) (1982): " 'navigable
airspace' means airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations is-
sued under this chapter, and shall include airspace needed to insure safety in take-off and
landing of aircraft."
82 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. A legislative appointment of property
rights is significant in the context of airspace in urban development, see infra notes 118-20 and
accompanying text.
83 Staff of House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong., ist Sess., Legis-
lative History of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, at 98 (Comm. Print 1943).
84 Id. at 99-100.
1986] TAKINGS JURISPR UDENCE
demonstrate harm to their land.8"
In Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport,16 the plaintiff was unable to
demonstrate an interruption with the enjoyment of his surface prop-
erty although he charged trespass on account of airplanes flying over-
head.87 The court reasoned: "Title to the airspace unconnected with
the use of land is inconceivable. '8 8 Thus, the Hinman court held that
ownership of airspace above the ground is limited to that which is
occupied or used in connection with the land.
Twenty years after its passage, the Air Commerce Act and the
continued vitality of the cujus maxim were tested by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Causby.89 The plaintiffs owned a chicken
farm near a government operated airport9 ° and claimed that repeated
low level flights over their land was a "taking of [their] airspace. '"91
Finding that "continuous invasions of [the airspace] affect[ed] the use
of the surface of the land itself," the Supreme Court agreed that a
taking had been effected. 9z The Court defined the property taken in
terms of an easement appurtenant to the land itself,93 not in terms of a
discrete segment of the vertical column of air.94 The Court held that
the easement in the airspace was inextricably tied to the landowner's
full use of his land: "[I]f the landowner is to have full enjoyment of
the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of
85 See Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932), in which the own-
ers of 272 acres of land across the road from an airport brought suit against the airport's
owners to enjoin them from flying or permitting airplanes under their control to fly over their
land at altitudes of less than 500 feet. The court held that the Air Commerce Act of 1926 was
unavailable for establishing altitudes below which landowners' interests in airspace would be
absolute. Id, at 203. Nevertheless, the court, recognizing a "traditional policy of the courts to
adapt the law to the economic and social needs of the times," id., held that the surface owner
does have a "dominant right of occupancy for purposes incident to his use and enjoyment of
the surface," id.
86 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 654 (1937).
87 Id. at 756. Although the Hinman court made no mention of the Air Commerce Act, the
case arose not long after the Act became law. Discussion of the cujus maxim in the context of
air travel is relevant here insofar as the tone of the court's opinion demonstrates the force with
which the cujus maxim had been supplanted.
88 Id. at 757.
89 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
90 Id. at 258.
91 Brief for Respondent, reprinted at 90 L. Ed. 1208 (1946).
92 328 U.S. at 265.
93 Id. at 267-68. Contra Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co. 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (1906); but
see supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. The Causby Court recognized the importance of
accurately describing the nature of the property taken. Although it agreed with the lower
court's description of the property as an easement, it remanded the case for further findings to
determine whether the easement was permanent or temporary in order to assess the proper
amount of compensation to be paid. 328 U.S. at 268.
94 See supra notes 24-46 and accompanying text.
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the enveloping atmosphere.
95
Implicit in the Court's Causby analysis is a longstanding refusal
to consider the airspace as an entity apart from the surface. 96 Re-
jecting the cujus maxim, the Court found that the government had
effected the taking by flying its planes outside the limits set by the Air
Commerce Act.97 And although Causby is often cited to support the
proposition that invasions of airspace may be compensable, 98 such re-
liance is misplaced as evidenced by the Court's reliance on Hinman.
The Court's reasoning was subsequently invoked by the Claims
Court in Hero Lands Co. v. United States.99 In Hero the plaintiff
owned sixteen tracts of land, all of which were either adjacent to, or
very near, a naval air installation.1 °" The plaintiff claimed that the
operation of the installation effected a taking of his airspace. 10 1 Dis-
missing the case, the Claims Court wrote:
As the regular and frequent flights by defendant's aircraft
through the airspace above . . . portions of the Hero Lands...
have not resulted in any substantial interference with the use and
enjoyment of such lands. . . it necessarily follows that the defend-
ant is not liable to the plaintiffs for the taking of [any] avigation
easements ... 102
A similar analysis has been used in the context of zoning near
airports. °3 In Indiana Toll Road Commission v. Jankovich,1°4 the op-
erators of a municipal airport brought suit for injunctive relief and
damages against the operators of a toll road because its height, in
violation of a restrictive ordinance, obstructed the glide path to the
airport. 105 The toll road operators defended the suit by claiming that
95 328 U.S. at 264 (emphasis added).
96 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. The Court's examination of the airspace was
subsidiary to its examination of the land. Adoption of this approach clearly contradicts the
approach taken by courts such as Butler. See supra notes 72-75.
97 328 U.S. at 260-61.
98 See, e.g., Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 625 (1963); Griggs v. Allegheny County 369
U.S. 84, 84-85 (1962).
99 554 F. Supp. 1262 (Cl. Ct. 1983).
100 Id. at 1263.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1264.
103 See, e.g., Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391
(Cal. Ct. App. 1969); Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Roark v. City of Caldwell, 87 Idaho 557, 394 P.2d 641 (1964);
McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253 (Minn. 1980); Jackson Mun. Airport Auth. v.
Evans, 191 So. 2d 126 (Miss. 1966); Yara Eng'g Corp. v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L. 370, 40
A.2d 559 (1945).
104 244 Ind. 574, 193 N.E.2d 237 (1963), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 487 (1965).
105 Id. at 575-77, 193 N.E.2d at 237-38.
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the zoning effected "a taking of private property for public use."106
The state legislature had provided that "ownership of the space above
the lands and waters of this state is declared to be vested in the several
owners of the surface beneath."1"7 As a result, the state's high court
had few obstacles in finding for the toll operators. 10 8 Still, the state
court, relying upon the reasoning of federal cases such as Causby for
support,' 0 9 ultimately held that "reasonable and ordinary use of air
space above land is a property right which cannot be taken without
the payment of just] compensation."1  Thus, despite Indiana's con-
stitutional provision for ownership of airspace, its highest court did
not treat the airspace as property for takings purposes but regarded
the government's interference solely in terms of the owner's use of the
land. 11
A survey of the cases dealing with airplane overflights reveals
that the courts have retained a traditional view of airspace as legally
significant only by reference to the underlying land.1 2 These cases
were tacitly governed by Congress' clear expression of its intention to
limit landowners' dominion over airspace-whenever air travel might
be affected. 3 Those cases decided in favor of the landowner may
therefore be understood as ones in which the government's interest in
air travel was surpassed by the landowner's use of his land.'
Although these cases may be read for the proposition that airspace is
not separable property protected under the fifth amendment, they
should not be controlling in other legal contexts absent an equally
106 Id. at 577, 193 N.E.2d at 238. Their claim rested on both the U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
and the Ind. Const. art. I, § 21, which provides as follows: "No man's particular services shall
be demanded, without just compensation. No man's property shall be taken by law, without
just compensation; nor, except in case of the State, without such compensation first assessed
and tendered."
107 See 244 Ind. at 579, 193 N.E.2d at 239.
108 The ease with which the court decided the case has been criticized for its superficiality.
See Comment, Airport Approach Zoning: Ad Coelum Rejuvenated, 12 UCLA L. Rev. 1451,
1454 (1965). The author proposes that cases like Jankovich be analyzed according to a system
of judicial cost allocation. Under this scheme, especially where the government is operating in
an enterprise capacity, the party most able to bear the cost of the property should bear the
cost. Id. at 1457-60.
109 244 Ind. at 580, 193 N.E.2d at 240. Certiori was dismissed as having been improvi-
dently granted, 379 U.S. 487 (1965). Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice White acknowledged
that although the state court relied on Causby and Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84
(1966), in reasoning that airspace is invested with some sort of protection, nothing in the state
court's opinion suggested that the right "flows from a federal rather than a state source," 379
U.S. at 491.
110 244 Ind. at 581, 193 N.E.2d at 240 (emphasis added).
111 Supra notes 24-46 and accompanying text.
112 See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text,
113 See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
11 E.g., Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1945).
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overriding government interest.' 15
III. AIRSPACE AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Property-in the modern sense of the word-can be understood
as people's established expectations as to the benefits they are likely to
derive from ownership of various things.' 16 Such expectations are, at
least in part, the product of case law. To the extent that court deci-
sions shape people's expectations, this definition of property is some-
what circular: when a court decides that a given thing is protectable
within the meaning of the fifth amendment, it not only creates prop-
erty, but it also creates the expectation that similar circumstances will
bring about the same result. A completely circular view of property
as comprised of nothing more than expectations shaped by case law
would ignore extrajudicial factors which also shape people's expecta-
tions about property.'17
One such factor contributing to the expectations giving rise to
the legal complexity of airspace is the existence of zoning. Since it was
first instituted in a comprehensive fashion in 1916, zoning has been a
feature of the urban landscape."' Admittedly within the bounds of
the police power, zoning restrictions limit the bulk, use, and height of
buildings which are permissible on land subject to zoning ordi-
nances.1" 9 As a result, zoning creates certain expectations in property
owners about the extent to which they may occupy their land. In so
doing, zoning apportions rights respecting airspace as well as land.
Of course, zoning ordinances may change and thus modify property-
115 See supra text accompanying note 45.
116 According to Jeremy Bentham:
The idea of property consists in an established expectation; in the persuasion
of being able to draw such or such an advantage from the thing possessed, accord-
ing to the nature of the case. Now this expectation, this persuasion, can only be
the work of law. I cannot count upon the enjoyment of that which I regard as
mine, except through the promise of the law which guarantees it to me. It is law
alone which permits me to forget my natural weakness. It is only through the
protection of law that I am able to inclose a field, and to give myself up to its
cultivation with the sure though distant hope of harvest.
J. Bentham, The Theory of Legislation 112 (C.K. Ogden ed. 1931). Professor Michelman
explains that "property" as proposed by Bentham is "the institutionally established under-
standing that extant rules governing the relationship among men with respect to resources will
continue in existence." Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1212 (1967).
117 See infra notes 118-138 and accompanying text.
I 18 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
119 See J. Dukeminier & J. Krier, Property 1230-31 (1981). Zoning has also been used to
regulate the aesthetic character of a neighborhood, e.g., Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305
(Mo. 1970), as well as to protect traditional family values, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974).
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owners' expectations, but propertyowners are protected against radi-
cal changes in their expectations as created by zoning ordinances.12 °
Within this general framework, zoning seems to create the expecta-
tion that ownership extends just so high, and up to that height the
cujus maxim remains applicable, permitting landowners to exercise
their rights in the airspace to the limits set by applicable zoning
ordinances.
Furthermore, urbanization gave rise to various commercial prac-
tices which further refined the apportionment of rights to land and
airspace, allowing property owners to maximize the development po-
tential of a particular lot.12' Railroads, in particular, developed a
commercial practice by which they separated, or bifurcated owner-
ship between surface and airspace of urban property. 22 This was nec-
essary for the railroads because they had acquired large parcels of
land to construct their trainyards in the country's major cities,'23 and
as technological developments allowed trains to run beneath the sur-
face, they were left with vast holdings of unimproved land.'24 The
companies then either leased or sold the adjoining airspace to others
for commercial development while retaining ownership of the under-
lying fee. 125  When disputes arose concerning particular aspects of
these transactions, such as demands for accounting of profits and
rents, the courts solved them without questioning the validity of the
transactions themselves or the legal recognition of airspace.' 26 The
courts' approval of these transactions thereby tacitly affirmed the con-
cept that air and land could exist as separable property for develop-
ment purposes and the practice of treating airspace as property to
facilitate urban development became widespread. By 1967, one au-
120 The vested rights doctrine, for example, may be invoked to protect a property owner's
right to develop his land if he has obtained certain building permits, made irrevocable expendi-
tures, or begun actual construction. See Cunningham & Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel, and
the Land Development Process, 29 Hastings L.J. 625 (1978).
121 See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
122 See R. Wright, supra note 63, at 223-37. Railroads also played a significant role in the
public use aspect of takings law. See supra note 22.
123 R. Wright, supra note 63, at 224.
124 Schmidt, Public Utility Air Rights, 54 A.B.A. Rep. 839, 843-44 (1929).
125 Id. Railroads were not alone in the separate development of airspace. The 11.7 acres
under New York City's Rockefeller Center were, for example, owned by Columbia University
which leased the rights to develop the airspace for more than 150 years. In 1985 the university
agreed to sell the land for $400 million to the Rockefeller family who, though owning the
buildings located on the site, had rented the land beneath them for more than 50 years. Dowd,
Columbia Is to Get $400 Million in Rockefeller Center Land Sale, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1985,
at Al, col. 3.
126 E.g., Phoenix Ins. Co. v. New York & H.R.R., 59 F.2d 962, 963 (2d Cir.) (suit for
accounting on rents and profits obtained from "improvements above the surface by commer-
cial structures"), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 645 (1932).
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thor noted forty examples of such projects in New York City and
Chicago alone, 1 27 and more than thirty others in towns and cities as
diverse as Ada, Oklahoma and Cleveland, Ohio. 128
Another of the factors contributing to the expectations surround-
ing airspace finds its seeds in the late 1960's when urban planners
conceived of another use for bifurcated development: as a means of
preserving valuable historic buildings without expending scarce mu-
nicipal funds for their acquisition. 129  The transferable development
right ("TDR") was created by these urban planners to allow undevel-
oped airspace above such buildings to be constructively transferred
elsewhere for development.1"'
127 R. Wright, supra note 63, at 261-64. Professor Wright's list was, admittedly, not ex-
haustive. See supra note 125.
128 R. Wright, supra note 63, at 265-68.
129 In 1968 New York City amended its landmark preservation law to allow owners of
designated landmark sites to transfer the unused airspace (development rights) to designated
receiving lots. New York, N.Y, Zoning Res. art. VII, ch. 4, §§ 74-79 to -793 [all references
herein to the New York City Zoning Resolution are to the Comprehensive Amendment of the
Zoning Resolution adopted by the Board of Estimate, effective 1961, and as amended through
1985].
Although some criticized New York's law as overly restrictive, its basic approach-aiding
cities in their efforts to preserve historical buildings-was embraced by legal and planning
communities throughout the country. See, e.g., Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning
and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 574 (1972). Professor Costonis
proposed a more liberal mechanism-a TDR bank-the use of which would permit the owners
of TDR's to use their rights more freely. Id. at 589-91.
For a thorough description of the history of New York's landmark law, see Marcus, supra
note 43, at 736-38; see also Rangel, City Procedures on Landmarks to be Reviewed, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 26, 1984, at B4, col. 3 (reporting the creation of a committee to explore problems
that have arisen in administering the law and possible solutions for the future).
130 The mechanics of the TDR can be demonstrated by taking the New York City method
as an example.
In New York City the zoning resolution sets the maximum height for buildings according
to the size of the tract on which the building will stand. See New York, N.Y., Zoning Res. art.
I, ch. 2, § 12-10. The city is also divided into districts, each of which is assigned an index
number called the Floor Area Ratio ("FAR") which "is the total floor area on a zoning lot,
divided by the lot area of that zoning lot," id. at 21 (emphasis omitted), which "may or may
not coincide with a lot as shown on the official tax map of the City of New York, or any
recorded subdivision plat or deed," id. at 48. The FAR is selected to reflect planning consider-
ations such as the availability of light and air, capacity of city services, and population density.
The FAR is multiplied by the lot area of the parcel to produce a number representing the
amount of usable floorspace that is permitted to be built upon the lot. New York, N.Y., Zon-
ing Res. art. I., ch. 2, § 12-10, at 21. Thus, where each of two adjoining lots, containing 10,000
square feet, is located in a district with a FAR of 10, each lot is capable of supporting 100,000
square feet of floorspace.
In the case of most historic buildings, the maximum amount of floorspace has not been
developed and the owner is left with an underdeveloped parcel. For example, the parcel con-
taining Grand Central Terminal, has an FAR of 2 where the allowable FAR is 18. Marcus,
supra note 43, at 737 n.24. To prevent the owner of a landmark building from altering, or even
destroying, the landmark in order to extract the land's maximum value, the city allows him to
constructively "transfer" the unused potential floorspace-the TDR-to a designated receiv-
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From the start, authorities differed on the best way to use the
TDR, but most agreed its benefits outweighed its liabilities. 13 1 Some
commentators thought that the TDR represented a legislative solu-
tion to the takings question'32 by providing compensation for takings
effected by restrictions placed on private property.'33 However, the
TDR may also be viewed as a legislative affirmation of the protectable
rights which attach to airspace. As such, the TDR is not compensa-
tion; it represents the acknowledged value of airspace by assuring its
holders of continued control over the value flowing from the exercise
of the rights attaching to the airspace despite the holder's inability to
physically occupy that space.' 34
Indeed, the TDR is now used to extract extra value from all land,
not only the sites of historic buildings,' 35 and several states have en-
acted legislation governing the development of airspace. 3 6 Munici-
palities have even begun to use the TDR for their own benefit by
selling or leasing the airspace above publicly-owned, underdeveloped
land to private developers.' 37
ing lot for development there. New York, N.Y., Zoning Res. art. VII, ch. 4, § 74-79, at 420
(emphasis omitted). Thus, if a landmark building stands on one of the hypothetical tracts
described above but occupies only 50,000 square feet of floorspace, its owner may "transfer"
the unused 50,000 square feet to a receiving lot so that it can support 150,000 square feet of
floorspace.
131 E.g., Costonis, supra note 129 (advocating use of a TDR bank as an aid in the preserva-
tion of urban landmarks).
132 See supra text accompanying notes 19-37.
133 E.g., Costonis, supra note 37. Professor Costonis argued that the TDR represented ac-
knowledgment of the accommodation power he advocated as a form of "fair" compensation.
Costonis, supra note 37, at 1065. His approach was criticized in Berger, The Accommodation
Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 799
(1976); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights, 84 Yale L.J. 1101
(1975) and more recently in R. Epstein, supra note 28, at 188-90. The Supreme Court did not
decide the issue. See infra notes 139-54 and accompanying text.
134 See supra note 130.
135 For example, the use of TDR's has been proposed to reduce the temptations influencing
farmers to convert their land at the urban fringes to nonagricultural uses. Torres, Helping
Farmers and Saving Farmland, 37 Okla. L. Rev. 31, 34 (1984). Professor Torres suggests that
careful assessment of the "agricultural infrastructure" along with the creation of designated
development zones will allow farmers to continue farming and, at the same time, to realize the
development potential of their land. Id. at 47-50.
136 At least sixteen states have enacted some sort of airspace legislation. They include: Ar-
kansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and
Wisconsin. General descriptions of these statutes are collected in Note, New York City Zon-
ing Resolution Section 12-10: A Third Phase in the Evolution of Airspace Law, 11 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 1039, 1046 n.42 (1983). See Schnidman & Roberts, Municipal Air Rights: New
York City's Proposal to Sell Air Rights over Public Buildings and Public Spaces, 15 Urb. Law.
347, 373-78 (1983) (appendix surveying state statutes that have recognized or have been ap-
plied to the use of public air rights).
137 Revenues from the sale as well as the taxes paid by private developers are luring many
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At the root of this activity lies the urban landowner's belief that
the expectations surrounding airspace-especially where TDR's are
available-are property to the same extent as the expectations sur-
rounding more conventional types of real estate. 13 8  However, the
only Supreme Court case to examine airspace and TDR's in a takings
context did not adopt this view.
IV. AIRSPACE AND URBAN DEVELOMENT: Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City
The only Supreme Court case to examine airspace and TDR's in
the context of a takings challenge was Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City ' 39 in which the validity of the New York City
Municipal Landmarks Law"4 designating Grand Central Station a
municipalities into the field. New York City is only one among several cities that have looked
to the TDR as a means of increasing revenues. Schnidman & Roberts, supra note 136. New
York City's plan to sell air rights on a large scale was first announced in 1980, and by 1982
owners of property adjoining city-owned real estate were invited to negotiate with the city for
the purchase of the airspace. Id. at 355-56. However, the plan was not free from controversy.
See Dunlap, City's Plan to Sell Air Rights At Landmarks Draws Critics, N.Y Times, Aug. 26,
1984, § 1 at 51, col. 1.
Municipal use of TDR's need not be confined to dense urban areas. See, e.g., Torres,
supra note 135; Comment, Condominiums in Downtown Public Parking Lot Air Rights: A
Creative City Planning Tool, 23 Santa Clara L. Rev. 607 (1983) (urging municipal sale of air
rights by small California communities).
138 "The key factor in an air rights arrangement is that each of two or more parties has
separate and distinct ownership or control of real property located in different horizontal strata
... " Morris, Air Rights are "Fertile Soil," 1 Urb. Law. 247, 248 (1969) (emphasis added).
Although one article defines air rights "like mineral easements [and thus] only a partial inter-
est in real property," Schnidman & Roberts, supra note 136, at 348, the former description of
air rights/airspace is the one adopted by The Model Airspace Act which is substantially simi-
lar to that adopted by the state of Oklahoma. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, § 801, 803 (West
Supp. 1985-1986); see also R. Wright, supra note 63 (advocating the same formulation as the
one adopted by the Model Airspace Act).
This expectation about airspace has generated scholarship addressing legal issues such as
conveyancing and taxing which are traditionally associated with conventional property law.
See, e.g., Note, Conveyance and Taxation of Air Rights, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 338, 354 (1964);
Comment, The Federal Income Tax Consequences of Commercial Conveyances of Rights in
Airspace, 47 J. of Air L. & Com. 91 (1981).
139 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
140 New York, N.Y., Admin. Code, ch. 8-A § 205-1.0 (1976). The ordinance was promul-
gated pursuant to the state's enabling act, N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 96-a (McKinney 1977),
which declares as state policy the preservation of individual buildings and areas with historical
value. It also authorizes local governments to pass reasonable restrictions to effect that policy.
New York City's ordinance specifically declares as its purposes:
(a) the protection, enhancement and perpetuation of such improvements and
landscape features and of districts which represent or reflect elements of the city's
cultural, social, economic, political and architectural history;
(b) safeguard the city's historic, aesthetic and cultural heritage .. .
(c) stabilize and improve property values in such districts;
(d) foster civic pride in the beauty and noble accomplishments of the past;
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historical landmark was challenged by the station's owner.",' After
the city designated the station a landmark, Penn Central and UGP
Properties entered into a lease agreement which provided for the con-
struction of a multistory office building to be perched above the termi-
nal.'42 As required by the ordinance, Penn Central and UGP
submitted architectural plans for the proposed building to the
Landmarks Commission. The plans were rejected, 43 and Penn Cen-
tral filed suit against the city.
Penn Central claimed that the application of the law took the
"air rights"-the space above the terminal-without just compensa-
tion.'" Rejecting the claim, Justice Brennan wrote:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a par-
ticular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court fo-
cuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature
and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole
145
Brennan proceeded to analyze the landmark designation not as
an interference with the airspace, but rather as an interference with
the underlying land. 46 He explained that because the site had been
used as a terminal for more than sixty years, it would be presumed
that the primary expectation attaching to the site was bound up with
the continued use of the terminal. 47 Accordingly, he reasoned, the
air rights could not be found to have been taken unless the plaintiffs
suffered harm through an adverse effect on the terminal itself.
148
(e) protect and enhance the city's attractions to tourists and visitors and the sup-
port and stimulus to business and industry thereby provided;
(f) strengthen the economy of the city; and
(g) promote the use of historic districts, landmarks, interior landmarks and
scenic landmarks for the education, pleasure and welfare of the people of the city.
New York, N.Y., Admin. Code, ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 (1976).
141 438 U.S. 104, 115 (1978).
142 Id. at 116.
143 Id. at 116-17. Under New York, N.Y., Admin. Code, ch. 8-A, § 207-5.0 (1976), the
Landmarks Preservation Commission reviews all plans for proposed alteration or destruction
of designated landmarks. The commission rejected two sets of architectural plans submitted
by Penn Central. Both designs were the work of the well-known architect Marcel Breuer who
is widely credited with the design of a tubular chrome and wicker chair which has been widely
copied, produced, and sold.
144 438 U.S. at 117-19. Penn Central also claimed that the ordinance deprived it of its
property without due process of law. Multiple claims are common. See supra note 7.
145 438 U.S. at 130-31.
146 Id. at 136.
147 Id.
148 Id. In addition, because of the existence of TDR's, the Court found that the underlying
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In ,support of his analysis Brennan cited three cases-Welch v.
Swasey,' 49 Gorieb v. Fox, 5 ° and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead ' -
as standing together for the proposition that neither air, lateral, nor
subjacent rights could be separated from each other for takings pur-
poses.' 52 Brennan wrote:
These cases dispose of any contention that might be based on Penn-
land retained enough value to avoid a finding that a taking had occurred. See infra notes 158-
65 and accompanying text.
149 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (takings claim based on height restriction).
15o 274 U.S. 603 (1927) (takings claim based on set-back ordinance).
151 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (takings claim based on prohibition against mining sand and
gravel).
152 438 U.S. at 130 n.27. In Welch, a Boston landowner claimed that a city ordinance
limiting the height of buildings in some districts to between 80 and 100 feet constituted an
uncompensated taking of his property. 214 U.S. at 103-05. The plaintiff challenged the city's
ordinance because it was more restrictive than a state statute setting maximum height limits of
125 feet in commercial districts and, on that basis, claimed that it was an excessive use of the
police power. Id. Welch argued that the ordinance deprived him of profitable use of the prop-
erty. Plaintiff's Brief, reprinted in id. at 95-100. He did not, however, precisely define the
property he regarded as taken; certainly the case reveals no attempt to separate air from the
surface of the parcel, nor was there evidence presented indicating the extent of Welch's
claimed loss. Thus, Justice Brennan's reliance on the case for the proposition that segmenta-
tion above the surface may not take place is unwarranted.
The court's reliance on Gorieb for its relevance to "lateral takings" suffers from similar
shortcomings. In that case, the plaintiff owned several lots within a district zoned for residen-
tial use. 274 U.S. at 605. He applied for, and received, a permit to construct a commercial
building on a lot adjacent to the one on which he resided. Id. His permit required him to
construct his building further from the street line than he wished. He challenged a city ordi-
nance that set a line parallel to the street in front of which a building could not be erected as
violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th amendment. Id. at 604-05.
His claim was rejected-largely because the application of the ordinance put the plaintiff in a
better position than others on the block. Id. at 606. Again, there is no indication from the
case that the plaintiff attempted to divide the property into discrete segments, nor does it
appear that the court cautioned him against doing so. Instead, finding that the regulation
operated rationally, and that the city had, in fact, relaxed the ordinance's effect on the plaintiff,
the Court sustained the constitutionality of the ordinance. Id. at 610.
The third case upon which Justice Brennan relied in support of his assertion that property
cannot be separated for takings purposes is Goldblatt. In that case, which Justice Brennan
described as being relevant to subjacent rights, the property owner held a 38-acre tract on
which it mined sand and gravel. 369 U.S. at 591. As a result of the owner's excavations, a
water-filled crater formed and over the years grew into a 20-acre lake around which the town
of Hempstead developed. Id. In 1958 the town amended a longstanding ordinance by prohib-
iting excavations below the water table. Subsequently it brought suit to enjoin the owner from
continuing to excavate. Id. at 592. In its defense, the owner challenged the ordinance's consti-
tutionality claiming that it confiscated its business-taking it without just compensation. Id.
The owner claimed the ordinance took the use of the tract as a whole for excavation purposes,
not simply the subjacent portion of the tract, as Justice Brennan suggested in Penn Central.
The rejection of the takings claim stemmed from the Court's refusal to look beyond the valid-
ity of the ordinance's purported safety features and from the owner's failure to produce evi-
dence compelling the conclusion that the ordinance was unreasonable; there was no apparent
refusal to segment the property into discrete layers. Id. at 595-96. But see infra notes 168-73
and accompanying text.
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sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon . . . that full use of air rights is so
bound up with the investment-backed expectations of appellants
that governmental deprivation of these rights invariably-i.e., irre-
spective of the impact of the restriction on the value of the parcel
as a whole-constitutes a "taking."'
153
This language suggests that Penn Central all but overrules
Mahon, at least so far as Mahon's holding applies in the context of
urban development. In fact, Brennan's opinion bears a remarkable
similarity to Brandeis' dissent in Mahon. 5 4
In effect, Brennan turned the clock back: although he used the
"too far" analysis developed by Justice Holmes in Mahon, 5 ' he ap-
plied the test only to "property" that seemed to fall within the older,
more formalistic conception. 156 Because the right to develop airspace
does not fall within that traditional formulation, Brennan concen-
trated his analysis on the land and asked, " 'What has been re-
tained?' " not " 'What has been taken?'"" Focusing his attention on
the regulation's effect on the underlying land-the terminal-Bren-
nan analyzed that effect according to the criteria set forth in
Causby.158
But the city had made the airspace transferable through the
153 438 U.S. at 130 n.27 (citation omitted).
154 Justice Brandeis wrote:
[W]e should compare [the value of the coal kept in place by the restriction] with
the value of all other parts of the land. That is, with the value not of the coal
alone, but with the value of the whole property. The rights of an owner as against
the public are not increased by dividing the interests in his property into surface
and subsoil. The sum of the rights in the parts can not be greater than the rights in
the whole.
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
155 Brennan explicitly noted that the Court did not "embrace the proposition that a 'taking'
can never occur unless government has transferred physical control over a portion of a parcel."
438 U.S. at 123 n.25.
156 "[Tlhe submission that appellants may establish a 'taking' simply by showing that they
have been denied the ability to exploit a property interest that they heretofore had believed was
available for development is quite simply untenable." Id. at 130.
This position is sharply criticized by Professor Epstein:
The protection afforded by the eminent domain clause to each part of an endow-
ment of private property is equal to the protection it affords the whole-no more
and no less. No matter how the basic entitlements contained within the bundle of
ownership rights are divided and no matter how many times the division takes
place, all of the pieces together, and each of them individually, fall within the
scope of the eminent domain clause.
R. Epstein, supra note 28, at 57; see id. at 189.
157 R. Epstein, supra note 28, at 62.
158 438 U.S. at 136; see supra notes 89-98. The Court also relied on Miller v. Schoene, 276
U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); and Goldblatt-none of which
concerned the divisibility of property interests. See supra note 152.
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TDR mechanism. 59 If the Court had viewed the TDR's as represent-
ing a legislative affirmation of rights attaching to airspace, 6 ° then
although the terminal owner was prevented from physically occupy-
ing the space located above the building, there still would have been
no taking. He was permitted to retain the value flowing from the
exercise of other rights attaching to the airspace-for example, use
and transferability.' 61 Because both the majority and dissent seemed
to believe that the TDR's were intended to provide a form of compen-
sation, this result was not reached in either opinion.
162
Brennan refrained from deciding whether the TDR represented
just compensation because he found that no taking occurred; he
merely commented that the value of the airspace for development
purposes apart from the terminal was sufficient to mitigate whatever
financial burdens were imposed upon the terminal's owner. 163 Im-
plicit in this finding is a recognition that certain rights associated with
protectable property 164 are attributable to airspace-a notion that is
in keeping with the modern concept of dephysicalized property. This
recognition, however, highlights the inconsistency of Brennan's analy-
sis. As he acknowledged the value of the airspace 65 (and the terminal
owner's ability to control that value once the airspace is made trans-
ferable through the operation of the TDR), he described essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that comprise the modern notion of
property. Why then the reluctance to incorporate this notion into his
takings analysis?
The answer lies partially in the Court's reliance on Causby,
159 Supra note 129; see supra note 130.
160 See supra text accompanying notes 132-34.
161 See supra note 130.
162 Although Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent, viewed the "air rights" as property
for fifth amendment purposes, 438 U.S. at 142-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), he found that the
landmarks law denied the owner all value flowing from those rights, id. at 149 n.13. Thus,
finding a taking, Rehnquist analyzed the TDR to determine whether it represented just com-
pensation. Id. at 150-52. See supra notes 132-37, and accompanying text.
163 438 U.S. at 137.
164 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
165 The Court deferred to the New York court's findings on the value of the TDR's. 438
U.S. at 119-22. See Penn Cent. Transp. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 334-35, 366
N.E.2d 1271, 1276-77, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 920-21 (1977).
Before Penn Central reached the New York Court of Appeals, that court had confronted
the TDR on other occasions. E.g., Lutheran Church in Am. v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d
121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974); Newport Assoc. v. Solow, 30 N.Y.2d 263, 283
N.E.2d 600, 332 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1972). Judge Breitel, who wrote the court of appeals opinion
in Penn Central to which Justice Brennan deferred, had in Newport described the TDR as a




which as noted above,1 66 did not require an examination of the air-
space apart from the land. It also lies in what may be described as a
traditional unwillingness to treat airspace as property for fifth amend-
ment purposes. 167  Such treatment of airspace is inconsistent with
courts' treatment of land in similar circumstances. Where, for exam-
ple, landowners challenged zoning ordinances as taking a portion of a
parcel of land, courts generally have been willing to analyze the ordi-
nance's effect on a section-by-section basis.1 68
The disparate treatment of airspace is highlighted by a recent
Ninth Circuit case, American Savings & Loan Association v. County of
Matin. 69 Although the court rejected the notion that as a matter of
law a parcel must be considered as a single unit for takings pur-
poses, 70 it distinguished Penn Central because it believed that the
"challenged government action [in Penn Central] had not divided the
property into discrete segments and the court refused to do so. '71 In
the Ninth Circuit case, the parcel under consideration consisted of a
point of land surrounding San Francisco Bay and a spit of land ex-
tending into it. The plaintiff claimed that because the zoning ordi-
nance had a more restrictive effect on the spit than on the point, it
effected a taking of the spit. 17 2 The court did not decide the merits of
the takings question, but remanded for a determination of "whether
the challenged ordinance creates two separate parcels for takings pur-
poses."' 17 3 The court held that the determination was a factual ques-
tion whose answer relied in large part on whether the sections were
treated differently under the plaintiff's own development plan.'74
Despite some courts' willingness to separate property for takings
purposes and despite its own recognition of the legal existence of the
TDR's, the Penn Central Court continued to analyze the takings
claim in terms of the land.1 75 Had the Court carried its analysis of the
166 Supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
167 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
168 E.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); American Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
County of Main, 653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1981); Fifth Ave. Corp. v. Washington County, 282
Or. 591, 581 P.2d 50 (1978) (en banc); Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34
(1951).
169 653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1981).
170 Id. at 369.
171 Id. at 369-70.
172 Id. at 371.
173 .Id. at 370.
174 Id. at 371. The concurrence went even further and suggested several additional factors
the district court might consider in making its determination. They included the geological
history and physical characteristics of the spit as well as the county's historical treatment of
the area. Id. at 373 (concurring opinion).
175 438 U.S. at 137.
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TDR's'further, it would have found that the incidents of ownership
secured by the TDR's compelled an examination of the takings claim
with respect to the airspace rather than with respect to the land. It
would have seen that the landmark status of the terminal did not dis-
turb those incidents of ownership because they remained in the hands
of the plaintiff. 176 Thus the Court would have achieved the same re-
sult and at the same time extended the fifth amendment's protection
to airspace in the form of the TDR.
V. LOOKING AHEAD
A reexamination of the nature of property rights discussed
above 177 is useful here. The legal rights that define the scope of prop-
erty ownership-possession, exclusion, alienation, use, management,
economic gain, consumption, and immunity from expropriation 78
are applicable to intangibles. By identifying these incidents of owner-
ship, courts may protect interests whose status within the scope of
property rights may have been, in an earlier time, somewhat uncer-
tain. As state and local governments create and define TDR's in
terms of the fixed boundaries of the underlying land, they are quanti-
fying the airspace and giving the landowner not only the right to ex-
clude others from it, but also the exclusive right to use and retain its
income. Yet, takings law continues to disregard the owner's right to
immunity from expropriation of the airspace.1 79
This is not to suggest that every new height restriction or zoning
amendment would operate to take property without just compensa-
tion. Rather, fifth amendment protection of airspace would require
courts to examine the effect of the government's action on airspace
independent of any effect the action may have on the underlying land.
Thus, where a height restriction or other government action has the
effect of limiting a landowner's ability to make use of his airspace,
courts should ask whether extrajudicial factors created any reasonable
preexisting expectations with respect to that airspace. 180 Courts
would then be in a position to inquire whether the government action
altered those expectations before they examined whether the govern-
ment action altered any expectations attaching to the land.
For example, an urban developer might purchase TDR's to con-
176 See supra text accompanying note 134.
177 Supra notes 22-49 and 116-17 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
179 E.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104; see supra notes 139-76 and accompnaying text.
180 Cf. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 120, at 715 (asserting that because governments'
regulatory power is increasingly the source of individual rights, governments must be sensitive
to such rights in the exercise of their power).
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struct a large-scale project. If, subsequently, a government regulation
is passed which has the effect of denying him the ability to use the
TDR's, the developer would be able to argue that the entire value of
the acquired property had been destroyed. Such a case would fall
squarely within the scope of Mahon; just as the coal company lost the
entire value of its subterranean rights, the urban developer has lost
the entire value of his airspace.
Some may argue that this approach would unduly burden gov-
ernments' ability to advance important policy objectives through zon-
ing or landmark protection, 181 but this need not be the case. When a
government creates the TDR, it expresses a policy about development
which has the effect of not only enabling owners to treat airspace as
severable from land, but also encouraging them to do so. Courts
should therefore pay deference to such propertyowners who, by ac-
quiring TDR's are acting in accordance with that policy.
Answers to the following questions may serve as a guide to a
judicial inquiry of this sort: How has the jurisdiction historically
treated airspace? Is the jurisdiction one in which the airspace is
cloaked in the legal trappings of property? If so, what sorts of expec-
tations attach to the airspace? Are those expectations altered as a
result of the regulation? Does the owner maintain control over those
expectations? Does the regulation completely destroy their value? 18 2
Only when satisfied that the owner maintains control over the value
flowing from those expectations should the challenged regulation be
permitted to stand.
Propertyowners and cities alike stand to benefit from the mea-
sure of predictability that would be afforded by this approach. By
extending the full protection of the fifth amendment to airspace in
these circumstances, both parties would be encouraged to continue to
use it in new and creative ways. Adoption of this approach would
also continue the trend toward a flexible concept of property that re-
spects the rights of private property owners without sacrificing the
state's interest in promoting the public welfare.
CONCLUSION
Valid historical reasons may have existed for the courts' place-
ment of airspace outside the scope of traditional property law. How-
ever, in light of developments in the law of property and
advancements in the field of urban planning, courts must refine their
181 See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 7.
182 See supra note 174.
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definition of property to include airspace. When faced with takings
challenges involving airspace, courts should consider the circum-
stances giving rise to the expectation that airspace should be pro-
tected. This approach would provide that expectation with the legal
protection it deserves and simplify one of the more troublesome as-
pects of takings jurisprudence.
Mary B. Spector
